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ARTICLE

AN ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE
DESERT PALACE
William R. Corbett*

"[W] hile his eyes are blinking and before he has become
accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to
fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images
or the shadows of images of justice
"1
.

.

.

.

"[T]hese are their hypotheses, which they and every body
are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to
give any account of them either to themselves or others; but
they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last,
and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?"2
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INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this nation's
landmark employment discrimination law, reached its fortieth
anniversary in 2004.3 In the midst of anniversary celebrations,
there is an issue of transcendent importance that demands
imminent resolution. No issue is more crucial to the litigation of
intentional discrimination cases than determining what effect
the U. S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa' has on the pretext proof structure developed by the Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green .5 For thirty years, since the
Court announced it in 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has
been the colossus of employment discrimination law.6 Is it
possible that the Court unceremoniously toppled McDonnell
Douglas in Desert Palace without even bothering to mention the
case by name? Litigants, lawyers, and judges need an answer to
that question now.
Just over a year after the Court decided Desert Palace, the
Fifth Circuit, in Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc.,7 became the first
federal court of appeals to address the issue squarely. In an age
discrimination case, the court concluded that Desert Palace does
not abrogate McDonnell. Douglas, but instead only requires a
modification of that proof structure.8 The court explained that the
new analysis , which it called "the modified McDonnell Douglas
approach," merges the McDonnell Douglas (pretext) and Price

3.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2000)). Although enacted in 1964, the effective date of Title VII was
July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the
effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment).
4.
539 u.s. 90 (2003).
5.
411 u.s. 792 (1973).
6.
It was dominant for thirty years, and it has been on life support for more than a
year since Desert Palace was decided.
7.
376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
8.
Id. at 307, 312. The case also is notable for its holding that the changes wrought
in Title VII analysis by Desert Palace also are applicable to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. ld. at 311. To the extent that other circuits follow the Fifth Circuit in
this holding, the interaction of Desert Palace and McDonnell Douglas becomes even more
important.
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(mixed-motives) analyses.10 In this
modified or merged proof structure, the first two stages are good
old McDonnell Douglas: First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case, and second, the defendant must "articulate a
legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason" for the
adverse
employment action.11 Then comes the new part: The court
explained that at stage three, the plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact12
either that the defendant's articulated reason was a prete� for
discrimination (the "pretext alternative") or that the defendant's
reason is true but another motivating factor for the decision was
discrimination based on a protected characteristic (the "mixed
motives alternative").13 'Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, all
that Desert Palace requires is a modification of the third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Desert Palace in Rachid
is an important change in employment discrimination law and
one that will be helpful to plaintiffs . Still, the Fifth Circuit did
not go far enough in assessing the implications of Desert Palace.
McDonnell Douglas, as an important analytical tool with
procedural ramifications, is dead; that is a message that
demands a stentorian declaration. This truth leads to the
conclusion that McDonnell Douglas should be burned on the
funeral pyre of employment discrimination law. From its
inception, the pretext proof structure has been an analytical
framework that has been used by courts at two procedural stages
of disparate treatment cases (the "assessment of the sufficiency
of the evidence" stage and the "evaluation of the weight of the
evidence" stage) to make decisions about whether cases should
proceed and who should win. McDonnell Douglas, divested of any
procedural significance after Desert Palace, no longer serves the
purpose it served during its first thirty-one years. Consequently,
there is no reason, other than nostalgia, to keep it. The more
compelling reason to banish it, however, is that because of its
long history of procedural significance, retaining it will cause
Waterhouse

9.
10.

v.

Hopkins9

490 u.s. 228 (1989).
Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.

11.
ld.
12.
It is important to note that the procedural posture of Rachid was an appeal of
the district court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ld. at 308.
As will be discussed below, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure has been intimately
tied to procedure, and viewing it in the context of procedure is a key to determining its
continuing viability in light of Desert Palace. Refer to Part IV. C infra.
13. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
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confusion in cases and impede recognition of the uniform proof
structure that necessarily follows from Desert Palace.
I have been down in the cave before.14 The case law and
commentaries published in the period since the Desert Palace
decision have convinced me that it is time to descend once again.
II.

AN ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE DESERT (PALACE)

It is time to climb out of the cave and look at employment
discrimination law in the bright light of the sun. Although it was
understandable that we looked at discrimination cases and saw
the shadows (the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the
mixed-motives analysis) while we were prisoners in the cave, we
cannot remain so shackled. On a sunny day in June 2003, the
fetters of some prisoners were taken off, 15 and we ascended out of

14.
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 199 (2003) (discussing the aftermath of Desert Palace and that
case's effect on McDonnell Douglas).
15.
With humility, I claim to be one of the freed prisoners. See, e.g., Corbett, May
You Rest in Peace?, supra note 14 (arguing that Desert Palace has eliminated McDonnell
Douglas, even though many commentators and practitioners wish not to admit it). I am
not alone, but the truth I have seen varies somewhat from that seen by my fellow
pilgrims. The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, a federal district judge, quickly announced
that Desert Palace had shed light on the shadow of McDonnell Douglas. See Dare v. Wal
Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003) ("The dichotomy produced by
the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one."). Judge Magnuson subsequently
further explained his view in a concurring opinion in an Eighth Circuit decision,
concluding that "it is simply impossible to reconcile the ancient McDonnell Douglas
paradigm with the clear language of the Civil Rights Act." Griffith v. City of Des Moines,
387 F.3d 733, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially). Other judges
followed. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers oflowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1196 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting that although Desert Palace does not "necessarily spell the
demise of the entire McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm," it does "spell the
demise of the 'false dichotomy' between the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . and the
Price Waterhouse framework"); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003
WL 21976027, at *12 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 2003) (agreeing that "plaintiff may bring his Title
VII claim 'according to the burdens articulated in [the] Civil Rights Act of 1991,' without
being confined to the strictures of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework"
(alteration in original)), affd, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). While affirming the district
court's decision, the Eighth Circuit panel rejected the proposition that Desert Palace
abrogated McDonnell Douglas. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736 ("[W]e conclude that Desert
Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions."). Other
commentators also ascended from the cave. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect
of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV.
83, 103 (2004) (positing that in light of Desert Palace's eradication of the distinction
between mixed-motives cases and pretext cases, "the standardization of disparate
treatment cases will essentially return disparate treatment jurisprudence to 1972, before
McDonnell Douglas v. Green was decided"); Kenneth R. Davis, Price Fixing: Refining the
Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 859, 907 (2004) ("McDonnell Douglas should retire and make a graceful retreat into
history."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le Roil": An Essay on the Quiet
Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert
-
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the cave into the Desert and the light of the upper world. Because
of the brightness of the light and the fact that our eyes were
accustomed to the dark, it was too painful for us to look at the
sun, and when we first saw the real object in the harsh light, we
thought that perhaps the shadows were truer than the real object
itself. But after growing accustomed to the light of the upper
world, we saw the shadows as imperfect substitutes for the real
object ("because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").16 Mter marveling at the sight of the real object, we
enlightened ones must "go down to the general underground
abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark"17 to teach what we
have seen in the world above to the other prisoners who remain
shackled.18 But the prisoners in the cave, who have lived their
lives watching shadows cast upon a wall, will say that we
enlightened ones ascended from the cave and returned without
our eyes.19
Who could have known that Plato saw the plight of
employment discrimination lawyers, judges, and scholars so
clearly in the allegory of the cave! Did the fifth century
philosopher foresee the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa and the subsequent maelstrom? If so, the
philosopher's prescience rivals that of Nostradamus. Regardless,
his allegory accurately depicts the state of employment

Palace Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 72 (2003)
[hereinafter Van Detta, "Le Roi"J (claiming that "McDonnell Douglas v. Green is dead"
(footnote omitted)); Jeffery A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort" Redux: Section 703(m), Costa,
McDonnell Douglas, and the Title VII Revolution-A Reply, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 445
(2004) (criticizing those who believe that McDonnell Douglas is alive and stating that
"there is no more room for McDonnell Douglas in the world of Title VII litigation").
16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 1, Book VII, at 220.
17.
18.
One may ask why I descend into the cave again, having already once gone down
and proclaimed what I saw in the upper realm. See generally Corbett, May You Rest in
Peace?, supra note 14. There are several answers. First, I fear that in the first year after
the Desert Palace decision, the benighted prisoners in the cave are winning in promoting
their shadows over the real objects. Refer to notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text
(discussing Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004)). This
interpretation of the law must be stanched as soon as possible, as this matter is too
important to allow the proper result to emerge, if at all, over a period of years. Second, to
free the prisoners, I think the debate should be focused on a few principles that elucidate
the relationship between the shadows (the proof structures) and the real object
(employment discrimination). Third, as I understand the command of Socrates in Plato's
allegory, the freed and enlightened former prisoners must not only descend into the cave,
but also stay in the cave and continue teaching. Fourth, is not it time for the second
generation of Desert Palace articles? Fifth, how many times does a law professor limit
himself to one article on a topic?
19.
See Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 383, 395 (2004) (contending that the holding of Costa is narrow and does
not overrule McDonnell Douglas).
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discrimination law in the United States in the twenty-first
century.
I apologize to both Plato and those whom I am depicting as
shackled, benighted prisoners in a cave. I mean no harm. I
ack.nowledge that I am no sagacious philosopher, and I know that
those who believe that McDonnell Douglas survived Desert
Palace are not intellectually inferior to me. The allegory is
important, however, to show that the proof structures we use to
analyze employment discrimination are not the thing itself, but
are like shadows of the ultimate issue, and we have become so
fixated on them that we are not able to see the thing itself and
discuss it apart from the proof structures.
I refuse to be characterized by the cave dwellers as an
opponent of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. I have loved it
well,20 I hope that I have defended it with great honort and I
have almost made· a career of writing about it. I cannot, however,
ignore the truth that I have seen in the bright light of the Desert
(Palace) sun, even if the cave dwellers, whom I hope not to
offend, have not seen it. 22
III. HISTORY AND HIEROGLYPHICS
The relevant history can and should be stated succinctly; it
has been recounted often.23 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed, obviously, in 1964 and became effective in 1965.24 Title
VII is the employment section of that landmark civil rights law.

20.

See, e.g. , William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of"Pretext Plus,"

and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996)
(defending McDonnell Douglas and criticizing the Supreme Court's subsequent
refinements of the analysis).
21.

Was e'er so eloquent an apology written? See, e.g. , William R. Corbett, Of

Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison
McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL. J. 361 ( 1998) (praising McDonnell
Douglas for the role it has played in employment discrimination litigation). Though I do
not consider myself sagacious, one may believe that I love to cite my own work-that is
three citations so far. Alas, when you have been to the upper realm, you must tell what
you have seen.

22.

Although I attempt to treat the topic with some levity in this Article, as one

must do when characterizing people with another view as prisoners in a cave, I wish to be
clear that the issue is of the utmost importance in employment discrimination law. Every
day of the week, courts throughout the nation are considering motions for summary
judgment and jury instructions and necessarily grappling with the effect that Desert

Palace has on the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. This is not merely an interesting
debate about theory. Litigants' rights are at stake, and the issue needs to be resolved with
all deliberate speed.

23.

For some of the most recent recitations, refer to notes 15, 19 supra.

24.

Refer to note 3 supra.
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Title VII is generally understood as declaring it unlawful to
discriminate in employment decisions and actions "because of
[an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."25 In
1973, in the second Title VII case to reach the U.S. Supreme
Court26-McDonnell Douglas-the Court recognized how difficult
it is for plaintiffs to present evidence of discrimination ''because
of [their] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Accordingly, the Court created a proof structure (or analysis or
framework, if you prefer) to be used in evaluating intentional
discrimination cases.27 Justice O'Connor would later explain that
the shadow was created to aid plaintiffs, who seldom have the
benefit of direct evidence, in the presentation of their evidence of
discrimination. 28
The McDonnell Douglas, or pretext analysis, is a three-part
framework. The first step under this framework requires the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination.29 To meet the prima facie case, a plaintiff must
prove (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the
plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the job at issue;
(3) despite the plaintiffs application and qualification, the
plaintiff was rejected; and ( 4) the position remained open and the
defendant-employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
the same qualifications as the plaintiff.30 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, a presumption is created that the
defendant-employer unlawfully discriminated against the
plaintiff.31 At this point, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination
by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for rejecting the plaintiff or preferring someone else. 32 Once the
defendant-employer satisfies this burden of production, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's
reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. 33 The meaning

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
25.
26.
In the first Title VII case to reach the Court, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), the Court recognized the disparate impact theory of employment
discrimination.
27.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The critical issue
before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a[n] . . . action challenging
employment discrimination.").
28.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
29.
30. Id.
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981).
31.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32.
Id. at 804.
33.
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and procedural effect of the second and third stages were
developed in subsequent Court decisions: Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine,34 St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,35 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, lnc.36 The
elements of the prima facie case have been adjusted to address
different types of cases, such as various adverse employment
actions (McDonnell Douglas involved a refusal to rehire) and
"reverse discrimination" cases.37
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment discrimination law.
Although developed in a Title VII case, it has been applied to
intentional discrimination claims under almost all of the federal38
and state employment discrimination laws.39 It has been adopted
(sometimes with modifications) for retaliation claims40 and
employment law claims other than employment discrimination.41
The Court developed an alternative proof structure for
intentional discrimination cases . in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. 42 The plurality's framework is commonly referred to as
the "mixed-motives analysis" because it permits a finding that
the adverse employment decision was taken for both lawful and

34.
450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (holding that when the plaintiff in a Title VII case "has
proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the burden of
explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions").
35.

509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993) (declaring that proof of pretext at the third stage of

McDonnell Douglas does not require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff).

36.
530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (holding, with regard to the third stage of
McDonnell Douglas, that a prima facie. case and sufficient evidence of pretext usually will
support a finding by the trier of fact of unlawful discrimination without additional,
independent evidence of discrimination, though such a showing may not always be
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability).
37.
(1976).

See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 & n.6

38.
See, e.g., West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 384-85 (5th Cir.
2003) (applying pretext analysis in an ADEA case); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc.,
300 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying mixed-motives analysis to an ADA case), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003).
39.
See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113-14 (Cal. 2000) (adopting
McDonnell Douglas's three-stage burden-shifting test in a case decided under California
law).
40.
See, e.g., Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 577 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a trial court must give a pretext jury instruction for a retaliation claim
under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
41.
See, e.g., Grey Wolf Drilling Co. v. Perez, No. 04-02-00802-CV, 2004 WL 383328,
at *1-*2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 3, 2004, no pet. h.) (applying pretext analysis to a
claim of retaliatory discharge under the state workers' compensation law).
42.
490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Price Waterhouse proof structure was borrowed from
constitutional law analysis in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. u. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977). Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248-49 (plurality opinion).
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unlawful reasons.43 The first step of this· analysis required the
plaintiff to show that a protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in the employment decision.44 Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion stated the measure of causation
as higher than a motivating factor: Causation should be
measured by determining whether a protected characteristic
was a substantial factor in the employment decision.45 Once the
plaintiff met her burden, the burden then shifted to the
defendant-employer to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it would have taken the same action for
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reasons.46 This
affirmative
defense, often called the "same-decision defense," permitted the
defendant to escape liability.47
In the aftermath of Price Waterhouse, courts were left to
glean from the several opinions a standard of causation to use in
the mixed-motives analysis. The plurality opinion adopted a
"motivating factor" standard, but it did not have the support of a
majority of the Court. Justice O'Connor's "substantial factor test"
was the standard used by most courts after the Price Waterhouse
decision. A second issue courts had to resolve after Price
Waterhouse was the criterion to distinguish between when the
McDonnell Douglas pretext or the Price Waterhouse mixed
motives analysis applied to a particular case. Courts again
turned to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and seized upon
the distinction she made: Cases involving direct evidence were
analyzed
under
mixed
motives,
and
cases
involving
circumstantial evidence were analyzed under the pretext
framework. 48
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress set abo11t to rectify
several employment discrimination decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, and Price Waterhouse was among them.49 The
Price Waterhouse modification and codification produced a
motivating factor standard of causation and a same-decision
limitation of remedies in which the burden of persuasion is on
the defendant. 5° Under the statutory version of that analysis, a
plaintiff proves discrimination if she proves that the protected

43.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).

44.

Id. at 257 (plurality opinion).

45.

Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

46.

!d. at 252-53 (plurality opinion).

47.

Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).

48.

Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 45-49 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
49.
549, 583-87.

50.

Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991).
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characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's
decision.51 At that stage, the employer is liable for a violation of
the employment discrimination statute, but the employer has the
opportunity to establish a partial affirmative defense: If the
employer proves that it would have taken the same action absent
the impermissible motivating factor, then the remedies are
limited to some types of injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
attorneys' fees (which are discretionary), and costs.62 This same
decision limitation of remedies had been a complete affirmative
defense under the Price Waterhouse version.53
After the emergence of the mixed-motives proof structure in
1989, the law of intentional discrimination was divided between
McDonnell Douglas pretext and Price Waterhouse-Civil Rights
Act
of 1991
mixed
motives. McDonnell
Douglas was
predominant,64 as courts determined that most cases involved
"only" circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence.55 One
court adroitly depicted the difficulty courts faced in classifying
cases: "[A]lthough the results of the analyses are significantly
different, the analytic difference between these two types of cases
is razor-thin, which has made the area a particularly difficult one
for the courts . . . ."56 Given the difficulties posed by classifying
and analyzing cases and the important rights at stake, the two
proof-structure state of the law was criticized, 57 with McDonnell
Douglas bearing the brunt of the criticism.68 Some commentators

51.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).

52.

§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) .

53.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion).

54.
See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REv. 226,
408-09 & n.66 (2003).
·

55.
See, e.g. , Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework because it was specifically
developed to deal with cases involving "only'' circumstantial evidence of discrimination);
MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1441 (lOth Cir. 1996) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework because the plaintiff failed to produce direct
evidence of discrimination).
56.

Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995).

57.
See, e.g. , Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discr:imination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv.
1161, 1219 (1995).
[N]either the Price Waterhouse Court, nor the district and circuit courts which
applied it, have been able to devise workable standards for delineating the
respective spheres of the pretext and mixed-motives variants of disparate
treatment proof. Indeed, under the current majority approach to this problem,
neither the parties, the court, nor the jurors are apt to know which of the two
competing variants will apply to determine liability until, at the earliest, the
conclusion of the plaintiffs case.
Id.

58.

See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
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advocated a uniform analysis for intentional discrimination
cases.69
By 2003 the stage had long been set for Desert Palace, in
which McDonnell Douglas met the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The
Ninth Circuit rendered an en bane decision in Desert Palace,
holding that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there was no
basis for requiring direct evidence to invoke the motivating factor
standard of section 703(m).60 Accordingly, the court held that

Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2259 (1995) (commenting on burden of proof problems
under McDonnell Douglas that were created after the Hicks decision); see also Judith
Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1487, 1527 n.l82 (1997) (agreeing with Malamud that it would be best to abandon
McDonnell Douglas). See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty
and Error in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing "whether the Hicks Court's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test
increases the fairness and accuracy of the Title VII system"); Kenneth R. Davis, The
Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995) (calling for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas because
its pretext rules are unsatisfactory, its claimed benefits are "largely illusory," and it is
superfluous in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering
Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment
Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 43 (1993) (criticizing McDonnell Douglas because
its proof structure is ineffective in resolving motions for summary judgment and its
constitutional law ideology complicates the practical problems in employment
discrimination law); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima
Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997) (arguing for replacement of
the McDonnell Douglas minuet with "a Restatement-like set of proof requirements"
because "the McDonnell Douglas framework contributes about as much to the proper
outcome of a discrimination case as the Star Spangled Banner contributes to the proper
outcome of a baseball game").
59.
Professor Michael Zimmer was the principal proponent of the uniform analysis.
See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 713 (2000) (arguing for a uniform
approach that would allow the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability by proving
the defendant's employment decision was motivated by a protected characteristic and, if
so proven, under which the defendant could affirmatively defend that it would have made
the same decision despite the characteristic); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform
Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 625
(1996) [hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure] (recommending that all
disparate treatment cases should be analyzed under the uniform structure established by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating
Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REv. 234, 262 (2001)
(suggesting that the courts should perform a textual analysis of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 in deciding employment discrimination claims and offering some practical issues
that attorneys will face in these cases). But see Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price
Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB . & EMP. L.
303, 330-32 (2003) (dividing cases by "affirmative" and "negative" evidence of
discrimination and preserving McDonnell Douglas analysis for cases involving negative
evidence).
60.
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane),
affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Section 703 is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has
subsequently been modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a court to
give the mixed·motives jury instruction. 51 The Ninth Circuit also
explained that McDonnell Douglas remains a viable analysis at
the summary judgment stage, but is not relevant to jury
instructions.62 Regarding jury instructions, the Ninth Circuit
opined that a court, in evaluating the evidence, can give one of
two instructions: (1) if the court evaluates the evidence as
supporting a finding either that a discriminatory reason was the
sole reason or not a reason at all, the court should instruct the
jury to decide whether the employment action was taken
''because of' the illegal reason, or (2) if the court evaluates the
evidence as supporting a finding that a discriminatory reason
was among two or more reasons for the employment action, the
court should instruct the jury regarding the motivating factor
standard and the same-decision partial defense.53
Surprisingly (at least to me), the Supreme Court affirmed
,
the Ninth Circuit in a unanimous "short and direct opinion' s4
that held that "in order to obtain an instruction under
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice."'65 With that, the
Court dispensed with the circumstantial-direct evidence line of
demarcation between McDonnell Douglas pretext cases on the
one hand and mixed-motives cases on the other. The Court
reiterated the point in a footnote: "[I]n light of our conclusion
that direct evidence is not required under§ 2000e-2(m), we need
not address . . . the appropriate standards for lower courts to
follow in making a direct evidence determination in 'mixed
motive' cases under Title VII [.]"66 So what did the Court say
about McDonnell Douglas? Nothing expressly. In fact, the Court
clarified what it would not say; in a footnote,- the Court stated,

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 856-59.
ld. at 856.

Id. at 856-57.
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 54, at 404. The
64.
same commentators also described the opinion as "short in length and modest in tone." Id.
at 410. Although brevity, directness, and modesty are usually virtues to be extolled in
court opinions, I would have preferred more length and flamboyance if that was necessary
to produce discussion in the Court's Desert Palace opinion of the vital signs of McDonnell
Douglas.
65.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) (2000)).
66.
Id. at 101 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"This case does not require us to decide when, if ever,
§ 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context."67
For over a year now, lawyers, courts, and commentators
have been grappling with the issue of what effect Desert Palace
has on McDonnell Douglas and thus on the litigation of
intentional discrimination cases under perhaps all federal
employment discrimination statutes.68 The court decisions can be
divided into the following groups: (1) those taking note of the
issue but determining that they do not have to decide it,69 often
because they find that the same result would be reached under
either analysis,70 (2) those holding that McDonnell Douglas
survives Desert Palace,71 and (3) those holding that Desert Palace

Id. at 94 n.l.
67.
AB previously mentioned, the pretext and mixed-motives analyses have been
68.
applied to intentional discrimination cases under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Refer to note 38 supra and
accompanying text. Because the Desert Palace decision is based on the language of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII and the ADA, but not the ADEA, it can
be argued that Desert Palace is not applicable to the ADEA. See Rachid v. Jack In The
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310-12 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit, however, decided
to apply whatever changes were made by Desert Palace to the ADEA.id. at 312 (holding
that "the mixed-motives analysis used in Title VII cases post Desert Palace is equally
applicable in ADEA''). Other circuits may disagree. See, e.g., Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d
330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004) ("We have not had occasion to decide whether the mixed-motive
provision under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to the ADEA. We have previously
expressed doubt that it does, and instead we have suggested that the Price Waterhouse
framework still applies to ADEA claims."); see also Snik v. Verizon Wireless, No. Civ.A.03CV-2976, 2004 WL 1490354, at *2 (E.D. Pa. . July 1, 2004) (noting a possible conflict
between the Fifth Circuit in Rachid and the Fourth Circuit m Mereish).
69.
See, e.g., Riggs v. Kan. City Mo. Pub. Sch. Dist., 385 F.3d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.
2004) (observing that the court need not decide whether Desert Palace altered McDonnell
Douglas); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2004) (deciding, as a
different panel of the Fifth Circuit than that which decided Rachid, that the McDonnell
Douglas issue did not require determination because the plaintiffs claims "fail[ed] under
any interpretation of Desert Palace"); Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d 551, 557-58
n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Desert Palace but declining to decide its effect on the McDonnell
Douglas issue because the petitioner "provided no evidence, direct or circumstantial, from
which a reasonable jury could logically infer that age or gender was a motivating factor in
her termination"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004).
70.
See, e.g., Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the plaintiffs case should have survived summary judgment under either
the mixed-motives or pretext analysis); Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 303 F.
Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. La. 2003) (determining that the defendant's motion for summary
judgment "should be denied under both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the
mixed-motives analysis").
71.
See, e.g., Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
argument that Desert Palace overruled McDonnell Douglas); Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312
(declaring that the mixed-motives analysis survived Desert Palace through a merging of
the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse decisions); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp.,
360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (construing Desert Palace as providing the plaintiff at
the summary judgment stage with the choice of whether to invoke McDonnell Douglas's
presumption or simply "produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a
-
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struck down McDonnell Douglas.72 If one were keeping score, I
fear that the shadows to which we have grown accustomed are
keeping us enthralled.
Surely the Court did not intend to abolish thirty years of
employment discrimination case law without saying so. Fittingly,
in an area of the law in which debate about motivation,
causation, and intent flourishes, what the Court meant or
intended may not matter. From what the Court said, it
necessarily follows that McDonnell Douglas is gone. One can only
see this, however, by climbing out of the cozy cave.

IV. BEYOND THE SHADOW OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS:
MOVING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
The pretext analysis is an attempt to depict the fact of
employment discrimination through the shadows of evidence,
torts, and procedure. The first principle, among first principles,
that must be accepted to begin the journey out of the cave is that
the pretext analysis is not the real object. Achieving acceptance
of this principle is no small task. Thirty years of focusing on this
shadow has persuaded us that Title VII and the other
employment discrimination laws are all about the proof

discriminatory reason" motivated the employment decision); Carey v. Fed.Ex Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 914-17 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (analyzing the various
ways that courts have applied McDonnell Douglas since the Desert Palace holding and
concluding that the correct approach is a modified McDonnell Douglas framework);
Herawi v. Ala. Dep't of Forensic Sci., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (stating
that "there is nothing in Desert Palace to undermine the usefulness of McDonnell
Douglas"); Higgins v. Hosp. Cent. Servs. Inc., No. CIV.A.04-CV-00074, 2004 WL 2850079,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2004) ("McDonnell Douglas is still valid precedent."); Rozskowiak v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, No. 01 C 5414, 2004 WL 816432, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2004)
(concluding, after a review of Desert Palace , that "McDonnell Douglas remains a viable
framework for evaluating summ ary judgment motions"); Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen.
Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197-98 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that, in
light of Desert Palace, McDonnell Douglas only needs modification at the final stage of the
burden-shifting paradigm).
72.
See, e.g. , Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 (D. Minn.
2003) (interpreting Desert Palace as an affirmation that Congress intended to abrogate
the McDonnell Douglas analysis with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Griffith
v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 WL 21976027, at *12 (S.D. Iowa July 3,
2003) (agreeing with the holding in Dare), affd, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). Although
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in Griffith, it rejected the proposition that
Desert Palace abrogated McDonnell Douglas. See Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735. Judge
Magnuson, the district judge who authored the Dare decision, sat by designation on the
Eighth Circuit panel that heard Griffith and specially concurred to express his
disagreement regarding the continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 739, 745
(Magnuson, J., concurring specially).
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structures. 73 Admitting that the shadow is not reality will not be
easy.74
Title VII and the other employment discrimination laws
prohibit adverse employment actions ''because of' race, color, sex,
disability, et cetera. What does this mean? How are courts to
evaluate whether a particular adverse employment action was
taken because of a protected characteristic? The statutes do not
say-they do not define discrimination in a useful way-and this
is not an easy matter.75 That is why we have looked at the
shadows since 1973. It will hurt our eyes to look at employment
discrimination law in the bright light of Desert Palace.
A.

Evidence

Evidence principles have helped us see the shadows and
imagine what employment discrimination looks like. The courts
have told us that there can be either direct or circumstantial
evidence of "because of' discrimination. The proof structure
developed in McDonnell Douglas is nothing more than a set of
rules regarding presentation and evaluation of circumstantial
evidence. In that respect, it is like the tort "doctrine" of res ipsa
loquitur. Under res ipsa, if a plaintiff is able to establish certain
predicate facts, then that circumstantial evidence may have a
procedural effect on the case-such as creating a rebuttable
presumption of negligence or permitting an inference of
negligence.76 Courts have cautioned, however, that res ipsa
loquitur, although treated as mystical, is nothing more than a set
of principles regarding the use of circumstantial evidence. 77 The

73.
See, e.g., Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 84 ("McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine became such an ingrained part of employment discrimination law that few
remember what it was like without them or that they were not actually enacted as part of
Title VII." (footnote omitted)); cf. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra
note 54, at 409 ("[D]ependence on the McDonnell Douglas framework most likely reflects
unreasoned ossification of jurisprudence rather than informed confidence in its
application.").
74.
See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 1, Book VII, at 218; see also Corbett,
supra note 14, at 219 (predicting that judges and lawyers would "cling tenaciously to
McDonnell Douglas"); Van Detta, "Le Roi ," supra note 15, at 138 ("[I]t will take several
years to adjust to the new interpretation of section 703(m).").
75.
See, e.g. , Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 307-09 (2004) (stating that the statutes do not define
"discrimination," that "Title VII law has never been easy," and that "after more than a
decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII law has never been more
complex and confusing"); see also Davis, supra note 15, at 859 (describing employment
discrimination law as "befuddl[ing] most of those who have attempted to master it").
76.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154, at 370-89 (2000) (outlining the
elements of res ipsa loquitur).
77.

See, e.g. , Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 660

1564

HO USTON LAW REVIEW

[41 : 5

real issue 1n a negligence analysis is whether the defendant
breached the standard of care. The same warning about not
mistaking the principles of circumstantial evidence for the real
issue is equally applicable to the McDonnell Douglas pretext
proof structure.
Before Desert Palace, the type of evidence proffered provided
the line of demarcation between intentional discrimination cases
that were evaluated under the pretext proof structure and those
that were evaluated under the mixed-motives analysis. That
divider was never a good one because there is no bright line
between what is direct evidence and what is circumstantial
evidence.78 In Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
varying approaches among the circuits for distinguishing direct
from circumstantial evidence and, thus, how to choose a proof
structure.79 The court described this case law as "a quag}nire," a
"morass," and "chaos."80 The U.S. Supreme Court erased the
chimerical dividing line in Desert Palace, holding that direct
evidence is not required for a plaintiff -to obtain a motivating
factor jury instruction. 81 But the Court did not say, and in fact
declined to say, whether the motivating factor standard applies
to all intentional discrimination cases. 82
We have been here before. After Price Waterhouse, the Court
left the lower courts to work out how to apply its analysis to
intentional discrimination cases. Interestingly, the several
opinions in Price Waterhouse, with no majority on major issues,
left the lower courts with plenty of discussion with which to
work. Desert Palace, in contrast, leaves the lower courts with a
unanimous opinion but little discussion with which to work. The
Court's reticence notwithstanding, one conclusion necessarily
follows from the Court's Desert Palace holding-McDonnell
Douglas is dead.
Some courts83 and commentators84 insist that the two proof
structures remain. For example, one commentary states, "In
spite of the Court's silence, . . . it is clear that a meaningful

(La. 1990).
78.
See, e.g. , Kearney, supra note 59, at 304 (noting the lack of consensus among
federal courts in defining what evidence is "direct").
79.
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539
u.s. 90 (2003).
80.
Id. at 851-53.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 & n. 3 (2003).
81.
Id. ("[W]e need not address . . . 'the appropriate standards for lower courts to
82.
follow in . . . "mixed motive" cases . . [.]'").
Refer to note 71 supra and accompanying text.
83.
Refer to note 19 supra and accompanying text.
84.
.
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distinction between mixed-motive and pretext cases still exists
under Title VII after Costa."85 Such insistence avails little without
suggesting what new standard determines which cases are
analyzed under each proof structure. Courts and commentators
· have suggested that the remaining distinction is that there are
cases in which there is only a single motive for an adverse
employment action and cases in which there are multiple
motives.86 This distinction, however, will not suffice. It assumes
that single-motive and multiple-motives cases exist and that
litigants, lawyers, or courts can distinguish one from the other.
Under the case law that developed under Price Waterhouse, we
first looked to the type of evidence and then on that basis we
classified a case as single or mixed motive. The number-of
motives distinction was predicated on the type of evidence; it was
an evidence-based shadow, and apart from that shadow it has no
independent reality.87 Even if the distinction were founded on
reality, how are courts to know which cases are single motive and
which are mixed?
Professor Chambers has deftly demonstrated that the types
of evidence presented in pretext and mixed-motives cases do not
differ and thus that "one cannot support providing a motivating
factor instruction in a mixed-motives case and refusing to provide
one in a pretext case."88 Still, he questions what quantity and
quality of evidence "will trigger a motivating-factor instruction in
either case"89 and offers three possibilities.90 Although Professor

85.

The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 54, at 405.

See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004)
86.
(positing that a different analysis applies to cases in which there is a single motive versus
cases in which there are mixed motives); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases,
supra note 549, at 407-08 (distinguishing the "ultimate substantive issue of causation" in
pretext and mixed-motives cases).

87.
Judge Magnuson explained in Dare
987 (D. Minn. 2003),

u.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 267 F. Supp. 2d

The dichotomy produced by the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false
one. In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on [the] basis of one
rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are
the result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate and at times
illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and irrational.
Id. at 991; see also Krieger, supra note 57, at 1223 (''Mixed-motives theory reflects much
more accurately than pretext theory the processes by which cognitive sources of bias

result in intergroup discrimination . . . . Thus, in a very real sense, every case of
discrimination resulting from cognitive bias is a 'mixed-motives' case.").
88.

Chambers, supra note 15, at 99.

89.

Id.

Id. at 101-02. The three possible amounts of evidence sufficient to trigger a
90.
motivating-factor instruction would be (1) substantially less, (2) the same as that
currently required to reach a jury in a pretext case, or (3) the same as that required in
any standard disparate treatment case. Id.
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Chambers has cast light on most of the shadows, and although he
recognizes the correct answer, 91 he also recognizes that courts
may not be willing to overturn thirty years of employment
discrimination doctrine without a clear direction from the
Court. 92 Further, he states that the Court is unlikely to provide
further guidance. 93 Then, by explaining the options that courts
may pursue, Professor Chambers chooses to become descriptive
rather than prescriptive.94 In so doing, he does not insist upon the
necessary ramification of Desert Palace. He is probably correct
about what courts will do to accommodate McDonnell Douglas to
Desert Palace, and the preponderance of court decisions to date
confirm the accuracy of that prediction. My objective, however, is
different: I want to let the full light into the cave and dispel the
shadow of McDonnell Douglas's continuing viability once and
for all.

B.

Torts

Professor Van Detta has argued that employment
discrimination claims are tort claims.95 Indeed, Justice O'Connor
in Price Waterhouse prefaced a discussion of standards of
causation for employment discrimination by referring to "the
statutory employment 'tort' created by Title VII."96 The tort
characterization of employment discrimination claims is a big
subject,97 but I wish to examine only a small part of it. The
''because of' language has been interpreted as requiring proof of
causation.98 Employment discrimination law arguably took a bad
turn with this analogy to tort law because tort concepts of
causation do not capture the way in which discrimination
occurs.99 Indeed, Professor Krieger has offered a cogent argument

91.
Id. at 100 ("If the argument is persuasive, a motivating-factor jury instruction
would be appropriate in all standard, pretext, and mixed-motives cases.").
92.

Id. at 101.

93.

Id. at 102-03.

94.

Id. at 101-02.

95.

Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 81-83.

96.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
concurring).
97.

228,

264 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,

See, e.g., Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense

to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of
Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193-97 (1993) (decrying the privatization
(tortification) of Title VII) .
98.
Professor Van Detta decries the focus on intent and insists that the statutory
language signals causation. Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 92-100. Although this
may be a distinction worth pursuing, the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures have
been understood as evaluating causation.
99.

Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed
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that the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures, focusing as
they do on causation, fail to capture the cognitive process by
which discrimination occurs.100 With all of the U.S. Supreme
Court opinions on causation and Congress's adoption of the
motivating factor standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that is
not my fight here. The several opinions in Price Waterhouse make
clear that the proof structures have been based on an
interpretation of the standard of causation required by the
"because of' language of the statutes. The plurality said that "the
specification of the standard of causation under Title VII is a
decision about the kind of conduct that violates that statute."101
The plurality rejected the idea that "because of' necessarily
means but-for causation, adopting instead a motivating factor
standard of causation.102 The dissent criticized the plurality's
interpretation of "because of' as not meaning "but for" and
pointed out that by creating the affirmative defense, the plurality
had in fact retained a but-for causation standard.103 Concurring,
Justice O'Connor joined the fray over the appropriate causation
standard and expressly recognized the tort law roots of the but
for causation standard.104 Surveying the causation standards
discussed in tort law, Justice O'Connor agreed with the dissent
that "because of' means but-for causation, but borrowing from
tort law, she expressed the standard as a "substantial factor"
standard.105 Then, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
agreed with the Price Waterhouse plurality and defined the
standard of causation as a motivating factor standard: "[A] n
unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."106
It is often stated that the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis adopted a but-for standard of causation.107 Indeed, I have

Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REv. 17, 92 (1991) ("All
attempts to apply causal theories derived from tort law to human actions are doomed to

failure . . . . ").
100.

Krieger, supra note 57, at 1 1 64-65.

101.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237 (plurality opinion).

102.

ld. at 241 (plurality opinion).

103.

.
ld. at 282-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

104.

Id. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

105.

Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

106.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).

See Chambers, supra note 15, at 99-100 ("The Supreme Court's pretext
107.
jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff prove but-for causation."); Malamud, supra note 58,
at 2259 (noting that "but-for" is "the standard of proof generally required under
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine"); Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 59, at
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said that.108 I want to confess that I now have reservations about
characterizing the pretext analysis as incorporating but-for
causation. It may be more accurate to characterize the pretext
analysis, at least as it is stated (though perhaps not as it is
applied), as incorporating sole-factor causation.109 The principal
problem with characterizing the pretext analysis in causation
terms is perhaps that we are discussing "apples and oranges"
we long have mixed causation, motivation, and intention when
we talk about "because of' discrimination.110 As Professor Belton
has explained, there is a "potential conceptual difference between
'but for' and 'pretext' analysis."111 That is, when a factfinder
concludes at stage three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis that
the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual,
it concludes that the discriminatory reason is the sole basis for
the adverse employment action. 112 Still, the Court in Price
Waterhouse insisted on causation standards for ''because of'
discrimination, 113 and Congress appears to have followed the
Court in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .114 Although it may
be mixing causes, motives, and intents to compare the standards
of causation in the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures,
the Court did it in Price Waterhouse, and I think it is important
to do so here to understand why Desert Palace killed off
McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas's standard of causation
607 (referring to the "'but for' test routinely applied in McDonnell Douglas I Burdine
cases"); cf. Kearney, supra note 59, at 310 (contrasting the motivating factor causation
standard with McDonnell Douglas, and characterizing McDonnell Douglas as a
"determining" or "but for" factor test).
108.
Corbett, supra note 14, at 212.
See, e.g., Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 472 (3d Cir. 1993) <"mt is clear
109.
that in pretext cases the claim is that the discriminatory motive was the sole cause of the
employment action . . . ."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993). Professor Davis argues that
the pretext analysis included only a motivating factor causation standard. Davis, supra
note 15, at 895-98. I think he is the only commentator to advocate this proposition, and I
think he is incorrect. It may be that the pretext analysis cannot be properly interpreted in
causation standards, but the important point is that, as all have heretofore agreed, the
pretext analysis imposes a more rigorous burden on plaintiffs than !foes the motivating
factor standard. The objective of a majority of the Court in Price Waterhouse was to
develop a proof structure more favorable than McDonnell Douglas for plaintiffs who could
present direct evidence. Congress further eased the burden by codifying the motivating
factor standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
110.
Gudel, supra note 99, at 92 (reasoning that causal theories from tort law are
"doomed to failure" and that the question of racial discrimination cannot be resolved by
looking at motive or intent).
111.
Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1359, 1383 (1990).
See id. at 1384.
112.
113.
114.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
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(or whatever the analysis is measuring) is higher or more
rigorous (harder for a plaintiff to satisfy) than section 703(m)'s
motivating factor standard. After Desert Palace, a plaintiff
cannot be required to satisfy the higher standard of the pretext
analysis.
C.

Procedure

Fimilly, the most significant shadows in which we have seen
employment discrimination are those of procedure.115 The story of
the. development of intentional discrimination law is the story of
U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing the procedural significance
of evidence presented via the proof structures: McDonnell
Douglas, Burdine, Price Waterhouse, Hicks, Reeves, and Desert
Palace. There are two procedural stages at which the proof
structures can be invoked to analyze a case: decisions as to
whether a party (usually the plaintiff) has produced sufficient
evidence to get the case to the factfinder (motions for summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law) and decisions as to
whether the party with the burden of persuasion has satisfied
that burden. Discussing the proof structures in the abstract
that is, not in the procedural contexts in which they are
relevant-is a mistake that sometimes keeps one in the cave
looking at the shadows. For example, when the Court interpreted
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks,1 16 the interpretation was characterized as
a devastating loss for plaintiffs that had killed the · pretext-only
interpretation of the analysis.117 Hicks, however, held only that a
plaintiff does not necessarily satisfy the burden of persuasion
8
and win a case by proving pretext. 11 Most of the battles over the
import of proving pretext (the battle of pretext-plus versus
pretext-only119) arose in the context of whether a plaintiff satisfies

115.
See, e.g., Van Detta, «Le Roi," supra note 15, at 105 ("'Procedure now defines
\mlawful discrimination and determines the outcome of Title VII cases'-and it has been
largely that way since 1973." (footnote omitted) (quoting Phyllis Trapper Baumann et al.,
Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Interpretation of Substantive and Procedural
Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211, 220 (1992))).
116.

509 u.s. 502, 510-11 ( 1993).

117.
See, e.g. , Malamud, supra note 58, at 2234--36; see also Davis, supra note 15, at
869 (declaring that Hicks "remold[ed] the framework into ineffectuality" and "thwarted

the original purpose of the framework"). Professor Davis wrote his assessment after
Reeves, and I find it surprising that he views Hicks as eviscerating McDonnell Douglas in
light of Reeves. He views Reeves very differently than I, however, characterizing it as
further damaging McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 869-70. I view Reeves as reaffirming the
relevance of the pretext analysis to the burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence).
118.

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505-07.

1 19.

See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:
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the burden of producing sufficient evidence by proving pretext.120
The Court demonstrated this when it addressed the issue of the
effect of proving pretext on the burden of production in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc .121
The first procedural principle that will assist in the ascent
out of the cave is to consider the proof structures in the context of
procedure and, more specifically, in the context of the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. The Ninth Circuit
believed this and explained its abrogation of the direct evidence
requirement in Desert Palace by discussing it in a procedural
context.122 Although I believe the court made some mistakes, I
think it was correct to evaluate the ongoing relevance of the proof
structures in terms of their procedural ramifications.
The second principle regarding procedure is that if a proof
structure has no procedural effect, it should be discarded.
Commentators who called for the abandonment of McDonnell
Douglas after Hicks grasped this point,123 although they failed to
see the continuing relevance and importance of the pretext
analysis to the burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence).
Because the post-Desert Palace pretext analysis has no
procedural effect on evaluating either (1) the satisfaction of the
burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence) on motions for
s ummary judgment or judgment as a matter of law or (2) the
satisfaction of the burden of persuasion in the court's jury
instructions, the proof structure has no practical use and should
be abandoned.
I

will

address

the

post-Desert Palace irrelevance of
McDonnell Douglas to the burden of persuasion first, because the
conclusion I reach has implications for the burden of production
as well. The Ninth Circuit explained that the McDonnell Douglas
analysis is not relevant to jury instructions (which entail burden
of persuasion) but is instead relevant to the summary judgment
evaluation (which entails burden of production). 124 Having

The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGS

L.J. 57 (1991) (outlining the competing rules governing proof at the pretext stage).
120.
See Corbett, supra note 21, at 38 1-83 (discussing the impact of the Hicks
decision on the McDonnell Douglas analysis and the "pretext-plus/pretext only" debate).
121 .

530 u.s. 133, 142-43 (2000).

122.
(2003).

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90

123.

See, e.g. , Malamud, supra note 58, at 2236-37 (calling for abandonment of the

McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure because it "does nothing the normal rules of

civil procedure cannot do").
124.
Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 ("This determination is distinct from the question of
whether to invoke the McDonnell Douglas presumption, which occurs at a separate,
earlier stage of proceedings [and) involves summary judgment rather than jury
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explained that the pretext analysis is irrelevant to jury
instructions, the Ninth Circuit curiously (and incorrectly)
explained that two jury instructions are viable. First, if the court
evaluates the evidence and finds that it could support a finding of
multiple motives, then the court should instruct the jury on
motivating factor and the same-decision defense.125 If, on the
other hand, the court deems the evidence to support only one
cause for the adverse employment action, either a discriminatory
or nondiscriminatory reason, then the court should instruct the
jury to determine whether the action was "because of' the
discriminatory reason, and there is no same-decision defense.126
This "because of' jury instruction resurrects pretext despite the
court's insistence that McDonnell Douglas, or pretext, is not
relevant to jury instructions.
Using the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Desert Palace, one can
perceive that once the dividing line between pretext and mixed
motives cases is erased, McDonnell Douglas cannot have any
effect on jury instructions and the resolution of whether the
burden of persuasion is satisfied. I realize, of course, that the
Ninth Circuit did not view its "because of' instruction as related
to pretext, but in fact, it is . The court explained the basis for
giving the instruction: "If, based on the evidence, the trial court
determines that the only reasonable conclusion a jury could reach
is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the challenged
employment action or that discrimination played no role at all in
the employer's decisionmaking . . . . "127 That is exactly what
pretext analysis does-select one reason as the cause of the
action. Even before Desert Palace, many courts had said that
pretext jury instructions were not to be given.128 Mter Desert
Palace, such a jury instruction is nonsensical. 129 Plaintiffs have

instructions . . . . "); id. at 857 ("McDonnell Douglas and 'mixed-motive' are not two
opposing types of cases. Rather, they are separate inquiries that occur at separate stages
of the litigation."); see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that a plaintiff responding to a motion for summary judgment may choose
how to present her case-either pursuant to McDonnell Douglas or by simply presenting
direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the defendant).
125.

Costa, 299 F.3d at 856-57.

126.

ld. at 856.

127.

Id.

See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 ( lOth Cir.
128.
2002) (discussing the split but holding that under some circumstances it is reversible
error to refuse to give a requested pretext instruction).

129.

Professor Davis disagrees, arguing that ''the Supreme Court intended the

McDonnell Douglas framework to apply not only at the summary judgment stage but also

at trial." Davis, supra note 15, at 903. I do not understand how one can argue for a
uniform mixed-motives analysis with a motivating factor standard of causation, as Davis
does, and yet maintain that "a court will frequently have to provide the jury with
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always wanted the mixed-motives analysis with the lower
standard of causation and the shift in the burden of persuasion
on the same-decision defense. With no dividing line between
types of cases, there is no basis for a court to hold a plaintiff to
any standard of causation other than, or higher than, the
statutory motivating factor standard. One would have to believe
that there is some new divider other than direct evidence
circumstantial evidence for distinguishing cases. As discussed
above, no such standard is known.130 One may argue, however,
that regardless of the pretext and mixed-motives proof
structures, a ''because of' instruction must be permissible
because it uses the statutory language of Title VII. In light of
Desert Palace, however, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be
understood as clarifying the standard of causation indicated by
the 1964 phrase ''because of."131 Thus, after Desert Palace, a jury
instruction containing the motivating factor standard and the
same-decision partial affirmative defense encompasses all that is
needed and all that is correct in disparate treatment cases.
Suppose plaintiffs begin requesting "because of' or pretext
jury instructions in order to avoid the second jury instruction in a
mixed-motives analysis-the second instruction being the same
decision defense. Look at the shadows, and if you strain, you
might see a plaintiff argue to the judge that her evidence of
discrimination is so strong and the defendant's evidence so weak
that she is entitled to a pretext or a "because of' jury instruction,
which would deprive the defendant of the same-decision
instruction that limits remedies if the defendant satisfies the
burden of persuasion. In my last journey back into the cave, I
described the foregoing argument as "fanciful."132 Now I wish to
say more: it is wrong. First, it is not the province of either party
to decide what is the standard of causation applicable to the case;
that is the court's job.133 If one accepts my argument in the
preceding paragraph, that after Desert Palace the standard of
causation for all intentional discrimination cases is the
motivating factor standard, then the idea that a plaintiff could

alternative instructions." Id. at 904. Of course, Professor Davis and I disagree about the
standards of causation, and that at least in part explains our difference on jury
instructions.
130.

Refer to Part IV.A supra.

131.
Davis, supra note 15, at 904 ("One of the purposes of Price Waterhouse and
§ 2000e-2(m) was to explain what 'because of means.").
132.

Corbett, supra note 14, at 214.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) ("At some point in
133.
the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a particular case
involves mixed motives.").
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request a jury instruction on a higher standard should not even
be entertained. Second, even if courts permitted litigants to
select their standards of causation, a residual "because of'
instruction does not make sense procedurally. If a plaintiff were
to gamble and argue for a jury instruction that imposes a higher
standard of causation, the court should decline · and instruct on
the motivating factor standard. The mixed-motives analysis
involves, when the same-decision defense is taken into account, a
but-for standard of causation. The dissent in Price Waterhouse
demonstrated that point.134 Thus, the plaintiff's argument must
be viewed as improvidently asking to be permitted to bear the
burden of persuasion on at least but-for causation (or perhaps
sole causation).
Yet suppose a plaintiff really wants such a ''because of' or
pretext jury instruction to ensure that all remedies are awarded
(differently stated, to ensure that there is no possibility of a jury
deciding the same-decision defense in favor of the defendant).
Surely the law must account for situations in which the plaintiff
has an overpowering case and those in which the defendant's
case is so weak that he is not entitled to raise the same-decision
defense. Furthermore, what about cases in which both sides
present evidence of reasons, but only one reason or the other can
be believed? The same-decision defense should not limit remedies
in either of those types of cases. The mixed-motives proof
structure, viewed in a procedural context, provides for both of
those types of cases and should produce a full recovery for the
plaintiff.
In the first type of case, if a plaintiff has such a strong case
and a defendant has such a weak case (meaning insufficient
evidence supporting its asserted reason for the adverse action),
then the court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law in favor of the plaintiff.135 The court should reach this result
by finding that the plaintiff proved an impermissible motivating
factor and that the defendant's evidence is so lacking on the
same-decision defense that the jury could not reasonably decide
in defendant's favor on that point.
Turning from cases that are ripe for decision on judgment as
a matter of law, imagine the second type of case in which
134.
Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the same-decision defense
invokes but-for causation).
135.
Courts have the authority to grant such motions sua sponte . See FED. R. CIV. P.
50(a)( 1); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey, 219 F.3d 519, 546 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that it is "'clearly within the [district] court's power"' to enter judgment as a matter oflaw
"on its own initiative" (quoting Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139
(6th Cir. 1995))).
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sufficient evidence supports both the plaintiffs alleged
discriminatory reason and the defendant's alleged legitimate
reason. A court may evaluate the evidence in such a case as
supporting a result in which only one reason can be credited,
because the reasons advanced by the plaintiff and the defendant
are mutually exclusive, but that decision is a credibility call for
the jury to make.136 Although a court should not dispose of such a
case by judgment as a matter of law, the jury can resolve it under
a mixed-motives jury instruction and award full remedies by
rejecting the defendant's same-decision defense. Although a
plaintiff may prefer to avoid the same-decision defense jury
instruction (and the prospect that the jury may reach the wrong
result under it), such avoidance is not appropriate when
sufficient evidence supports the employer's asserted reason.137
Thus, plaintiffs need not and should not resort to asking for
pretext jury instructions to obtain full relief, and in any event,
courts should not give such instructions. The procedural device of
judgment as a matter of law and the mixed-motives jury
instructions account for and produce appropriate results in cases
in which plaintiffs should be awarded all remedies.
The notion that the pretext analysis should be retained to
benefit plaintiffs on jury instructions is an incredible proposition.
The pretext analysis was developed for cases of "weaker"
circumstantial evidence. Has it now become the source of a jury
instruction that is to be the "secret weapon" sought by plaintiffs
with evidence so overwh�lming that they should be able to avoid
the same-decision defense? It takes a greater leap to read Desert
Palace as turning employment discrimination law on its head in
that way than it does to read Desert Palace as abrogating
McDonnell Douglas .
Thus,
pretext
analysis,
which
many
courts
and
commentators thought had no relevance to jury instructions and
burden of persuasion before Desert Palace, is now certainly
irrelevant. Perhaps, however, the pretext framework retains
procedural relevance regarding the burden of production

136.
I am indebted to Dean Rebecca Hanner White for pointing out the need to
address such cases.
The National Labor Relations Board has recognized that a mixed-motives
137.
analysis is adequate to address all types of discrimination cases, applying its Wright Line
analysis to cases alleging discrimination under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 (1980) (setting forth the
analysis), enforced, 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see also
Taylor & Gaskin, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 563, 563 n.2 ( 1985) (stating that Wright Line applies
to both pretext and mixed-motives cases); Kelly Robert Dahl, Note, Price Waterhouse,
Wright Line, and Proving a Mixed Motive Case Under Title VII, 69 NEB. L. REV. 869, 895
( 1990) (same).
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(sufficiency of the evidence). That is what the Ninth Circuit said
in its Costa opinion, 138 and that is the context in which the Fifth
Circuit found continuing viability in Rachid. 139
Burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence) long has
been the procedural stronghold of McDonnell Douglas. Mter the
"fall" of McDonnell Douglas in Hicks, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the relevance of the proof structure on the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc. 140 Although I argued after Hicks that McDonnell
Douglas still was procedurally relevant, 141 I see that it is
irrelevant after Desert Palace. Consider the usual situation in
which a defendant moving for summary judgment or judgment as
a matter of law argues that under McDonnell Douglas the
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of either the
elements of the prima facie case or pretext--the two stages at
which the plaintiff bears the burden of production.142 Because the
pretext analysis entails a higher (more rigorous) standard of
causation than the motivating factor standard, and because there
is no basis on which to divide the cases between the proof
structures, a plaintiff cannot be required to meet the pretext
standard on such a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. If
I am correct in my argument that pretext is irrelevant to the
burden of persuasion, it surely follows that the standard of
causation invoked by a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence must mirror the standard of causation invoked for the
burden of persuasion. That is, it would be erroneous to apply the
motivating factor standard for the burden of persuasion but
require pretext proof for the burden of production.
Even if pretext remains relevant to the burden of
persuasion, it does not follow that pretext analysis should
be used for the burden of production. The Court's plurality in
Price Waterhouse said that cases do not have to be labeled as
pretext or mixed-motives from the beginning.143 Because there is
no requirement that a case be classified at the summary
judgment stage, a plaintiff should be able to defeat a motion for

138.
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90
(2003). Refer also to note 124 supra.
139.

Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).

140.

530 u.s. 133, 142-43 (2000).

141.
See Corbett, supra note 21, at 391 (stating that McDonnell Douglas "gives
procedural significance to both the employer's articulation of a reason and the employer's
success or failure in responding to a plaintift's proof of pretext").
142.
See Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 105-08 (detailing defendants' use of
McDonnell Douglas on summary judgment motions).
143.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 ( 1989) (plurality opinion).
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summary judgment by producing sufficient evidence that the
discriminatory reason was a motivating factor.
If McDonnell Douglas is irrelevant to burdens of persuasion
and production, one could still argue that a plaintiff may present
evidence pursuant to the pretext proof structure. This essentially
was the position of the Fifth Circuit in Rachid v. Jack In The
Box, Inc . 144 Christopher Hedican, Jason Hedican, and Mark
Hudson, arguing for the continuing viability of McDonnell
Douglas, contend that a plaintiff can continue to prove
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas and that if a plaintiff
can thereby "make a submissible case . . . , then he or she is
entitled to the mixed-motive instruction."145 Indeed, it is true
that, even bereft of procedural effect, the pretext analysis could
be used by lawyers and courts to analyze the case and organize
the evidence. The problem with this seemingly innocuous
approach (''We've had it so long, can't we just keep it around and
play with it?") is that McDonnell Douglas has not been just a
playful pet. It has had procedural significance for a very long
time, and it is easy to become confused and believe that it still
does. Given its past, a merely "useful" McDonnell Douglas
analysis will cause more problems than it is worth.146 Moreover,
evidence is not presented in cases pursuant to McDonnell
Douglas, anyway. As Justice Scalia admonished the dissent in
Hicks, defendants do not come forward at some point during a
trial and say, "'Your honor, pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the
defendant
hereby
formally
asserts
[its
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason] . "'147 Plaintiffs can present pretext
evidence and any other evidence they have, and employers can
present evidence of their legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
just fine without McDonnell Douglas. Nothing is gained by
keeping it, except the prospect that it will be reinvested with
some of its procedural significance. Indeed, it is not clear in
either the Rachid opinion or the Hedican flow chart148 whether
the pretext approach is without procedural effect.
Stripped of procedural significance and having no place in
the organization and presentation of evidence at trial, what is
left for McDonnell Douglas? It is a mere shadow of its former self,

376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
144.
145.
Hedican et al., supra note 19, at 399.
See Davis, supra note 15, at 888-89 (arguing that the only usefulness of
146.
McDonnell Douglas now is forcing a defendant to articulate a reason for its action, and
that is not reason enough to keep it).
147.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 522-23 (1993).
148.
Hedican et al., supra note 19, at 426.
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and one that will confuse and distract us and generally work
mischief if it is permitted to linger.
V.

CONCLUSION

This is my second descent into the cave. I liked the shadow
that was McDonnell Douglas. I have been above, however, and I
have seen employment discrimination law in the light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Desert Palace decision. Like it or not, we must
abandon the shadow and learn to see in the bright Desert
(Palace) light. In 1995, after the Supreme Court decided Hicks,
Professor Deborah Malamud wrote that "the time has come to
put false appearances aside and to reorient the discourse on
disparate treatment cases accordingly."149 Although I thought her
call for abandonment was premature at the time, it is apt now.

149.

Malamud, supra note 58, at 2311.

